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Abstract
Phishing emails are a nuisance and a growing threat for the world causing loss of time,
effort and money. In this era of online communication and electronic data exchange,
every individual connected to the Internet has to face the danger of phishing attacks.
Typically, benign-looking emails are used as the attack vectors, which trick users into
revealing sensitive information like login credentials, credit-card details, etc. Since
every email contains important information in its header, this thesis describes ways of
capturing this information for successful classification of phishing emails. Moreover,
the phisher has total control over the email body and subject, but little control
over the header after the email leaves the sender’s domain, unless the phisher is
sophisticated and spends a lot of time crafting the attack, which reduces the payoff
or may even backfire or yield mixed results.
This thesis is a consolidated account of various systems designed to combat phish-
ing emails from different dimensions. The main area of focus is email header. Tech-
niques like n-gram analysis, machine learning and network port scanning are used to
extract useful features from the emails. This thesis shows that the classes of features
used in these systems are very effective in distinguishing the phishing emails from the
legitimate ones. Using different real datasets from varied domains, it highlights the
robustness of the methods presented. Some methods, like the header-domain analy-
sis, obtain high detection rates of 99.9% and low false positive rates of 0.1%. These
approaches have the advantage and flexibility that they can be easily combined with
other existing methods, in addition to being used in standalone mode.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the Internet has become an integral part of our lives we have entered an age
of online transactions. Almost every service we use has an online access portal.
These services need payment, for which we provide sensitive information like credit-
card details, bank account numbers etc. Since these websites handle such sensitive
information, their login credentials are also equally private and sensitive. Phishing
refers to the act of attempting to steal valuable and sensitive data from individuals
and organizations. It causes huge monetary and information loss. Such phishing
attacks are targeted towards obtaining valuable information from users as mentioned
above.
1
1.1 Motivation
The APWG Phishing Activity Trends Report for the 4th quarter of 2014 [4] showed
that the number of unique phishing reports submitted was 197,252, 18% more than
in the 3rd quarter. The number of unique phishing sites had also increased from
14,258 in November, 2014 to 17,320 in December, 2014. A total of 437 brands were
targeted in Q4 and United States was the country hosting the greatest number of
the phishing sites, yet again. This clearly shows that phishing detection is still an
unsolved problem and one which causes heavy damage to the people and the society.
The most common means used by the phishers are benign-looking emails that
lure users and trick them into revealing the sensitive data and thus result in loss and
misuse of valuable private information apart from monetary losses. Since email is
the most commonly used channel for phishing attacks, this thesis concentrates on
working towards an effective way of segregating them into phishing and legitimate
classes.
Every email consists of two parts: the header and the body. The header consists
of several pre-formatted fields such as From, Delivered-To, Subject, Message-ID, etc.
The body consists of the main content of the email, usually in text/HTML format.
The phishers make it very difficult to detect the phishing emails by meticulously
constructing them to closely resemble legitimate ones. This makes the process of
distinction non-trivial, which has been observed by other researchers [23] also.
The email body is completely under the control of the sender while the header
follows a relatively stricter format and is not entirely controlled by the sender. So the
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main focus of this thesis is on detection based on email headers, with some attention
to the email body text as well. In particular, based on looking at a few (less than 10)
legitimate emails and the same number of phishing emails, our attention was drawn
to the Message-ID in the header fields. This field is a string following a certain
basic format described in the Background Chapter. It also contains information
designed to make the email globally unique. It cannot be altered easily and it provides
important information about the email that includes it.
A part of the work presented here centers on these useful properties of Message-
IDs and exploits it further by applying n-gram analysis to the Message-IDs. Various
machine-learning algorithms including an on-line confidence weighted-learning algo-
rithm were employed using 10-fold cross validation on different data sets and they
produced detection rates of above 99%. To our knowledge, this is the first time
Message-IDs have been used with n-gram analysis to detect phishing emails. This
system is named Phish-IDetector and is explained in details in Chapter 5.
The headers were also observed to contain several domain names. These domains
contained information which can be used to trace the path of the email. The do-
mains closer to the receiver’s side cannot be altered easily and it provides important
information about the trail the email has followed. Different systems were built to
extract features from these domains for classification which have been described in
Chapters 6, 7 and 9.
3
1.2 Overview of Thesis
A brief overview of the rest of the chapters in this thesis is mentioned below.
1. Chapter 2: Includes background knowledge and preliminary information re-
quired to get a better understanding of the thesis.
2. Chapter 3: Includes description of Phish-IDetector, a Message-ID based phish-
ing detection system.
3. Chapter 4: Includes details about a combined grand experiment using header
and text analysis.
4. Chapter 5: Includes the description of email header domain analysis.
5. Chapter 6: Includes the description of SMTP analysis for emails.
6. Chapter 7: Includes study of the domain details obtained from the different
datasets.
7. Chapter 8: Includes the description of path analysis for emails.
8. Chapter 9: Includes the relevant related work for this thesis.
9. Chapter 10: Concludes the thesis.
1.3 Contribution
The major contributions of this thesis are as follows:
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1. The demonstration that Message-ID and domains from email header fields are
effective in phishing email detection [Chapter 3 and 5].
2. The approach of applying n-gram analysis technique with a rich variety of
classifiers to these email header properties [Chapter 3 and 5].
3. A novel approach to path analysis of emails by reconstructing the route using
Received-From and ‘by’ pairs [Chapter 8].
4. The SMTP experiment whereby we checked for open SMTP servers as an
indication of use of source routing by the phishers [Chapter 6].
5. A preliminary study of the domain details obtained from the different datasets
[Chapter 7].
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Chapter 2
Background
Electronic mail or email proliferated during the 1990s and has evolved to become an
indispensable part of our current social fabric. Essentially, an email has two parts:
the header and the body. The email body contains the actual message being sent
and is completely under the control of the sender. Whereas, email header consists of
several fields, some mandatory and some optional, which carry information regarding
the source, destination, routing details, timestamps, etc. [37]. Thus, the header
cannot be completely manipulated by the sender.
Every email contains information of the path it has taken since it left the sender’s
mail box till it reaches the receiver’s mail box. This information can be extracted
from the header fields of the email. Let’s consider a simple example where sender A
sends an email to receiver B. Though there are many header fields we will be focusing
on the ones which concern the email’s path of travel. In the most basic form, there are
four entities involved. The sender’s mail client referred to as a@sender.com, sender’s
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mail server mail.sender.com, receiver’s mail server mail.receiver.com and receiver’s
mail client b@receiver.com. The email is created by the sender using his mail client
and contains his own address as ‘From’ header and the receiver’s email as the ‘To’
header. Once sent, it passes on to his mail server which adds some header fields
like the ‘Received: from’ and the ‘Message-ID’ headers. Similarly, the receiver’s mail
server adds ‘Received: from’ header before passing it on to the receiver’s mail client.
Hence, at the end of the delivery process the length of email’s header increases with
every hop. In a more complex scenario where the email passes through several Mail
Transfer Agents (MTAs), more header fields are added to it.
We provide an explanation of some terms we will use frequently throughout the
paper.
Header domains. The header fields concerned with the transfer and delivery of
the emails mostly contain the name of the domain of each mail client and server that it
passes through. For example in the ‘From’ field address a@sender.com, ‘sender.com’
is the domain name. These domains are extracted from all the fields which contain
such information and are collectively addressed as ‘Header domains’ in the paper.
Message-ID. RFC 2822 [37] is a standard that specifies the syntax for messages
that are sent as “electronic mail” messages. It states that each email should have a
globally unique identifier called Message-ID. If this is included, it must be in the email
header. RFC 2822 also defines the syntax of Message-ID. It should be like a legiti-
mate email address and it must be included within a pair of angle brackets. A typical
Message-ID looks like the following:<20020923025816.8E7A34A8@mercea.net>. Ac-
cording to RFC 2822, Message-ID can appear in three header fields. They are (i)
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Message-ID header, (ii) In-Reply-To header and (iii) References header. The “In-
Reply-To:” and “References:” fields are used while creating a reply to a message.
They hold the message identifier of the original message and the message identifiers
of other messages (e.g. replies to the message). The “In-Reply-To:” field may be
used to identify the message (or messages) to which the new message is a reply,
while the “References:” field may be used to identify a “thread” of conversation [37].
But Message-ID of the present email should be included against the Message-ID
header [32]. The Message-ID has a fixed format of the form <LHS@RHS>where
the left hand side (LHS) is a representation of information including current time
stamp, queue id, etc. coded in different formats according to the Sendmail version.
The right hand side (RHS) represents the fully qualified domain name (FQDN).
This part starts with local host name followed by a dot and other parts of domain
information [12].
N-gram. The concept of N-gram is related to natural language processing. It is
a sequence of n characters in a string or text. For example if the text is abc123 the
1-grams would consist of one character sequence, e.g., a, c, 2, etc. Similarly, 2-grams
would be overlapping sequence of 2 characters like ab, bc, c1, 12, 23. This idea can
be further extended to higher order n-grams in a similar fashion.
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Chapter 3
Phish-IDetector
[This chapter’s contents have been published in 12th International Conference on
Security and Cryptography [42], SECRYPT 2015.]
Sendmail, one of the Mail Transfer Agents (MTAs) uses Message-ID for tracing
emails and for logging process ids [12]. Sendmail specification recommends including
Message-ID in emails and also the setting of relevant macros in its configuration file
in order to implement compulsory checking of Message-IDs [12]. “Unlike spoofing
other fields in the header, spoofing Message-ID needs special knowledge. Only tech-
nical savvy spammers can spoof the Message-ID cleverly” [32]. So, deep analysis on
Message-IDs may reveal some sort of information that could open a window to trace
the source of an email.
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3.1 Overview
Based on the above hypothesis, we delved deeper into Message-ID using n-gram
analysis up to 10-grams and found the optimum detection rates at around 5- or 6-
grams. For both higher and lower order n-grams the rates usually deteriorate. We
applied several machine learning classifiers using stable version 3.6 of Weka [19] and
an on-line confidence weighted learning algorithm of [28]. The complete process can
be summarized in the following sequence of steps.
3.1.1 Message-ID Extraction
For our study we decided to choose Message-ID as the distinguishing property be-
cause of its content, uniqueness and fixed format. All the Message-IDs from the
emails of different datasets are extracted using grep command and stored in a file.
Since each Message-ID is of the format <LHS@RHS>, we get rid of the <, @ and >
symbols common to all Message-IDs as a pre-processing step. After this step we get
two attributes for each Message-ID. We have named them LHS and RHS to denote
the left hand side and the right hand side of the Message-ID.
3.1.2 Input File Creation
Depending on which dataset the email belonged to, we labeled each instance as
belonging to either “phishing” or “legit” (legitimate) class. We created a csv file
with three columns: class label, LHS and RHS. The RHS part being of a more
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consistent format rather than LHS, we tried the classification based on only RHS as
well. In that case, there are only two columns: class label and RHS.
3.1.3 N-gram Analysis
Further, we performed n-gram analysis of the collected Message-IDs so that we could
represent the data in numeric format acceptable to most classifiers in Weka. We
decided to use n-gram analysis, as this kind of analysis is able to capture the structure
present in any text or string. As discussed in [9] the main advantage of N-gram-
based analysis is in its nature of n-gram creation. It helps in minimizing errors and
limiting it to only the n-grams derived from the erroneous part because every string is
decomposed into small parts. The remaining part of the text remains error-free. The
count of common n-grams between two strings is a good measure of text similarity,
and this measure has proved to be resistant to different kinds of textual errors. This
analysis generates unique n-gram features represented as Unicode code point of the
characters. For example, the Unicode code point for “a” is 97 so the 1-gram “a” will
be represented as 97. The feature extracted is the frequency of the n-gram in the
attribute LHS or RHS.
3.1.4 Classification
Once we obtained and represented the data in arff format, we ran the following six
classifiers on the arff file using Weka 3.6: RandomForest [8], J48 [36], Bagging [7],
AdaboostM1 [17], SMO [33] and NaiveBayes [24]. We also ran four other classifiers
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but their performance was not at par with the 6 classifiers mentioned, so we omit their
results. These are: ClassificationViaClustering, ComplementNaiveBayes, ZeroR and
BayesNet. The arff files were also converted to .svm format, the input format for the
confidence weighted algorithm [28], using a python script.
3.2 Data Sets and Classifiers
We have used two publicly available datasets. Email Message-IDs were collected
from 4,550 public phishing emails from [30] and from 9,706 legitimate emails from
SpamAssassin public corpus datasets at [3]. The phishing corpus and even the Spa-
mAssassin ham corpus we used has been used previously by [16], [38], [20].
SpamAssassin corpus segregates the emails into different subsets which we named
as follows:
1. easy ham consisting of 5051 emails
2. easy ham 1 consisting of 2500 emails
3. easy ham 2 consisting of 1400 emails
4. hard ham consisting of 500 emails
5. hard ham 1 consisting of 250 emails
All these emails had Message-IDs. We ran experiments on the phishing emails
combined with each of the above mentioned subsets of legitimate emails. All the
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Message-IDs obtained from the phishing emails were added to the set of Message-
IDs extracted from each of the above mentioned ham sets. These datasets are hence
named according to the ham set involved in creating the dataset since the phishing
set of Message-IDs is common to all of them. Additionally, all the experiments
were performed once taking only RHS into account and once taking both the RHS
and LHS into account, and the dataset names have been prefixed with RHS and
SplitMsgId respectively. The names of the datasets are as follows:
1. RHSEasyHam and SplitMsgIdEasyHam
2. RHSEasyHam1 and SplitMsgIdEasyHam1
3. RHSEasyHam2 and SplitMsgIdEasyHam2
4. RHSHardHam and SplitMsgIdHardHam
5. RHSHardHam1 and SplitMsgIdHardHam1
We used Weka version 3.6 which is basically a collection of machine learning
algorithms for data mining tasks. It was chosen because of its wide acceptability,
popularity and its ease of use. It has previously been used for phishing detection by
[20] and [11]. Weka provided us an easy method of comparing the performance of
several classifiers on our datasets and choosing the best among them. We ran the
experiments with around 10 classifiers and chose the best 6 among them. Each of
them is explained here in brief.
Random Forest classifier (RF) [8] consists of several decision tree classifiers.
Each tree has a random set of features out of the total feature collection and this
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algorithm returns the maximum frequency class among all of the individual deci-
sion trees. It performed the best quite consistently in our experiments. For our
experiments we used the default implementation of Weka 3.6 for the Random Forest
classifier.
J48 is a Java implementation of the decision tree formed by classifier C4.5 [36].
SMO is an implementation of sequential minimal optimization algorithm devised
by John Platt for training a support vector classifier. All attributes are normalized
by default in this algorithm. A more detailed explanation can be found at [33].
Bootstrap Aggregating or Bagging is a method for generating multiple versions
of a predictor and using these to get an aggregated predictor. The aggregation
averages over the versions when predicting a numerical outcome and does a plurality
vote when predicting a class. It is explained in [7].
AdaBoostM1 (ABoost) is an implementation of the boosting algorithm by [17].
It is known to improve performance of a weak learner using a boosting algorithm.
We have used the default base classifier for Weka 3.6 in this case.
NaiveBayes (NB) is the Weka implementation of the Naive Bayes classifier,
which is a simple classifier that applies Bayes’ theorem. It strictly assumes con-
ditional independence and hence called ‘naive.’ More information can be found at
[24].
For classification based on higher order n-gram analysis we used the faster on-
line confidence weighted learning algorithm of [28]. We obtained a collection of
most confidence weighted learning algorithm into a library written in Java from [13].
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Again, we selected the 10-fold cross-validation test option for maintaining uniformity.
With this algorithm we were able to perform the classification for all the files up to
10-grams.
3.3 Independent Experiment on Message-IDs
Due to privacy issues, legitimate emails used in the field of phishing emails detection
are usually not recent ones. To prove the viability of our method with current data
without compromising the privacy aspect, we performed an independent experiment
involving 10 anonymous volunteers. Each of them was given instructions along with
a script that would collect some statistics from each mail box. We collected only two
numbers from each of them, no. of emails (Email Count) and number of Message-
IDs (Message-ID Count) not revealing any private data in their emails. The process
involved configuring each volunteer’s gmail account in their local UNIX machines
using postfix and fetchmail. The script then separated the mailbox created for each
volunteer into individual messages using procmail. And finally grep command was
used to get the email count and the Message-ID count. We had to be careful not to
over count the Message-IDs as sometimes a mail can have more than one Message-
ID. To avoid such a mistake we used grep with the option of counting only the first
occurrence of Message-ID in each email.
The data collected from the volunteers is shown in Table 3.3. It reveals that
nearly 99% of the emails have Message-ID field and proves our hypothesis that in
spite of being an optional field it would have to be included in the emails by a phisher
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to avoid raising any red flags.
Table 3.1: Email and Message-ID count from the independent experiment. Nearly
99% emails have Message-Ids.
Message-ID Experiment
Volunteers EmailCount Message-ID Count
Volunteer 1 1959 1928
Volunteer 2 1613 1594
Volunteer 3 798 787
Volunteer 4 719 712
Volunteer 5 364 361
Volunteer 6 352 352
Volunteer 7 325 325
Volunteer 8 277 263
Volunteer 9 252 252
Volunteer 10 118 118
Total 6777 6692
Percentage Emails With Message-IDs
98.75
3.4 Results
Since the file-size increased exponentially for each subsequent n-gram, Weka would
crash for any n-gram higher than 3. Also, we could run only two classifiers for the
3-grams files due to the issue of large-sized files. For both 1- and 2-grams files we
ran as many as 10 classifiers and found Random Forest to be the most effective of
them all, obtaining highest True Positive rate (TPR) and the lowest False Positive
Rate (FPR).
TPR refers to the percentage of instances of a class x, classified correctly among
all the instances truly having the class x, i.e., what part of the class was captured.
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FPR refers to the percentage of instances of a class x classified incorrectly as some
other class among all the instances not of class x [34].
Looking at both the TPR and FPR values of these experiments, it was revealed
that with an increase in order of n-gram, the classification improves but it starts
deteriorating after a certain n-gram value. For most of the experiments this optimum
value was obtained at the threshold of around 5- or 6-grams.
We present our results of all classifiers for the best among all the datasets, i.e.,
Hard Ham. Also, to give an idea of the performance across all datasets we include
the results of our best classifiers, i.e., Random Forest and J48 for all the datasets.
Tables 3.1 to 3.3 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
dataset SplitMsgIdHardHam. Results show a constant increase in TPR and decrease
in FPR for higher order n-grams. So, the 3-grams results are the best in terms of
both TPR and FPR. Random Forest classifier even succeeds in getting 99.5% of
the phishing emails detected with a small number of false positives, i.e. legitimate
emails classified as phishing.Also, we find that the classifiers that perform the best
classification are tree classifiers Random Forest and J48.
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
dataset RHSHardHam. Similar to the SplitMsgIdHardHam dataset results there is
a constant increase in TPR and decrease in FPR for higher order n-grams. So, the
3-grams results are the best in terms of both TPR and FPR.
Note that the SplitMsgIdHardHam dataset gives better results as compared to the
RHSHardHam dataset. We hypothesize that many phishers lack adequate knowledge
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of LHS structure or do not spend time on it. Both RandomForest and J48 perform
almost consistently well for both the datasets at almost any n-gram value.
Tables 3.7 to 3.10 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the RandomForest and
J48 classifiers for the experiments across all datasets. These two classifiers performed
the best and we present these tables to compare their results for each of the datasets
we used. We find that the results are fairly consistent across datasets and there is a
gradual improvement of results with the increase in the order of n-grams.
We present the results of Confidence Weighted Classifier for all 10-gram datasets
in figures 10.1 and 10.2. The advantage of Confidence Weighted algorithm was that
it could easily run on all the 10-gram files and that it had quite low false positive
rate consistently as compared to the Weka machine learning classifiers. Though the
detection rates are not as high as Random Forest and J48 classifiers, the false-positive
rates are much lower.
3.5 Information Gain
After the first set of experiments, we were curious to know which features were
performing the best among all of the 1-gram, 2-gram and 3-gram attributes. A
widely accepted method to find out the most effective features in a multi-feature
classifier is calculating the information gain for the attributes. It is a measure of
the difference in entropy values. We present the top 10 features along with their
information gain values for each of the 1-gram, 2-gram and 3-gram features. From
these IG values we find that for the RHSHardHam dataset, the hyphen ‘-’ symbol is
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quite dominant as an attribute.
3.6 Security Analysis
Our method relies on the Message-ID field which, though important and recom-
mended, is optional. Without it, our method would not work. However, note that
almost all legitimate emails include this field, and since a phisher tries to fool the user
into believing that a phishing email is legitimate, omitting this field could serve as a
red flag. In our experimental data set, 100% of the legitimate emails had Message-
IDs. Our recent experiment with 10 volunteers reveals that the Message-ID field
is present in nearly 99% of the legitimate emails. Also, the exponentially increas-
ing file size for higher order n-grams makes it difficult to run different classifiers on
them without using specialized big data approaches. We currently ran only the con-
fidence weighted algorithm on higher order n-gram files, which has proven itself to
be competitive in other scenarios, but not guaranteed to be the ideal choice for best
results.
Spoofing Message-ID field requires a technically savvy phisher, who is willing to
go the extra mile to avoid detection. For example, either this field would have to be
deleted, which would raise a red flag in light of our experiment with 10 volunteers, or
the phisher would: (i) either fake the FQDN or (ii) copy the entire Message-ID field
from a legal message sent earlier, and the phisher would have to turn off any checking
in the mail program. For such sophisticated phishers, we recommend combining our
classifiers with other classifiers or features from the header, the links and the body
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text in the email, as, for example, in [41].
20
Table 3.2: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for Weka Classifiers on SplitMs-
gIdHardHam Dataset
1-gram for SplitMsgIdHardHam
Classifiers TPR FPR
RandomForest 99.5 4.9
J48 96.6 18
Bagging 96.7 27.5
SMO 94.3 46.8
AdaboostM1 94.9 37.3
NaiveBayes 87.2 29.7
Table 3.3: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for Weka Classifiers on SplitMs-
gIdHardHam Dataset
2-gram for SplitMsgIdHardHam
Classifiers TPR FPR
RandomForest 99.4 4.9
J48 97 18.4
Bagging 97.2 23.2
SMO 97.6 8.8
AdaboostM1 95 37
NaiveBayes 92 29.1
Table 3.4: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for Weka Classifiers on SplitMs-
gIdHardHam Dataset
3-gram for SplitMsgIdHardHam
Classifiers TPR FPR
RandomForest 99.3 5.2
J48 98.7 8
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Table 3.5: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for Weka Classifiers on RHSHard-
Ham Dataset
1-gram for RHSHardHam
Classifiers TPR FPR
RandomForest 99.4 5
J48 96.5 17.6
Bagging 96.7 27.4
SMO 94.3 46.8
AdaboostM1 93 59.4
NaiveBayes 88.1 45.4
Table 3.6: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for Weka Classifiers on RHSHard-
Ham Dataset
2-gram for RHSHardHam
Classifiers TPR FPR
RandomForest 99.3 5.2
J48 98 10.5
Bagging 97.7 18.6
SMO 98.8 5.5
AdaboostM1 93.9 54.1
NaiveBayes 92.4 35.8
Table 3.7: True-Positive Rate and False-Positive Rate for Weka Classifiers on
RHSHardHam Dataset
3-gram for RHSHardHam
Classifiers TPR FPR
RandomForest 99.4 5
J48 97.4 16.8
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Table 3.8: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for RandomForest and J48 across
all SplitMsgId Datasets
1-gram
DataSet RandomForests J48
(Split) TPR FPR TPR FPR
EasyHam 93.7 10.1 90.2 12.7
EasyHam1 95.7 4.6 91.3 9.2
EasyHam2 95.4 13.2 91 16.4
HardHam 99.5 4.9 96.6 18
HardHam1 98.5 26.5 97.3 36.4
Table 3.9: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for RandomForest and J48 across
all SplitMsgId Datasets
2-gram
DataSet RandomForests J48
(Split) TPR FPR TPR FPR
EasyHam 93.9 9.9 91 12.1
EasyHam1 96.1 4.2 92.3 8.2
EasyHam2 95.9 12.7 92.9 15
HardHam 99.4 4.9 97 18.4
HardHam1 98.5 26.1 97.8 33
Table 3.10: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for RandomForest and J48 across
all RHS Data Sets
1-gram
DataSet RandomForests J48
(RHS) TPR FPR TPR FPR
EasyHam 95.6 4.7 91.4 9.1
EasyHam1 93.7 10.1 90.2 12.7
EasyHam2 95.3 13.3 91 16.4
HardHam 99.4 5 96.5 17.6
HardHam1 98.5 26.1 97.3 36.8
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Table 3.11: True-Positive Rate and False-Positive Rate for RandomForest and J48
across all RHS Data Sets
2-gram
DataSet RandomForests J48
(RHS) TPR FPR TPR FPR
EasyHam 94.8 8.8 95.9 5.3
EasyHam1 98.5 1.5 96.6 3.4
EasyHam2 95 15.1 96.1 7.5
HardHam 99.3 5.2 98 10.5
HardHam1 97.9 36.4 98.4 22
Figure 3.1: True-Positive and False-Positive Rates for Confidence Weighted Classifier on
SplitMsgIdHardHam Dataset
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Figure 3.2: True-Positive Rate and False-Positive Rate for Confidence Weighted Classifier
on RHSHardHam Dataset
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Table 3.12: Information gain values of Top 10 attributes represented as ’Att’ in the
table for RHSHardHam Data Set.
RHSHardHam
1-gram 2-gram 3-gram
Att IG Att IG Att IG
- 0.110599 -a 0.125108 -sf 0.125992
a 0.103357 bv 0.118968 -a 0.125108
e 0.073969 sf 0.118461 -ac 0.122093
. 0.063256 v- 0.117757 fo1 0.122093
s 0.060871 1- 0.116663 -ag 0.122093
f 0.059647 o1 0.1156 abv 0.122093
t 0.058247 c- 0.11354 bv- 0.122093
g 0.055149 - 0.110599 o1- 0.122093
n 0.049335 -s 0.108526 1-a 0.122093
b 0.045831 a 0.103357 sfo 0.122093
Table 3.13: Information gain values of Top 10 attributes represented as ’Att’ for
SplitMsgIdHardHam Dataset
SplitMsgIdHardHam
1-gram 2-gram 3-gram
Att IG Att IG Att IG
. 0.2007 . 0.200703 . 0.200703
a 0.16614 a 0.16614 a 0.16614
o 0.15855 o 0.158549 o 0.158549
t 0.10909 l. 0.146136 il. 0.146136
r 0.10193 .J 0.14211 l. 0.146136
l 0.09794 Ma 0.140517 .10 0.144005
i 0.09426 aM 0.139745 .J 0.14211
v 0.0927 av 0.139732 Ma 0.140517
M 0.06281 ot 0.139432 Mai 0.139745
- 0.05612 va 0.138928 vaM 0.139745
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Chapter 4
Grand Experiment
4.1 Enhancement of Semantic Feature Selection
A general semantic feature selection method for text problems was proposed by [40]
which is based on the use of statistical t-test and WordNet - a lexical database, that
can work as both a dictionary and a thesaurus [15]. In the semantic feature selection
method, the email body text was used for feature selection using t-test. Weight
calculation of the features was done and the features with weights above a certain
threshold were used to form appropriate sets. These sets of features were then used
in different classifiers. Here is a brief overview of the system proposed.
The authors observed that 84.7% of the phishing emails had the word ‘your’,
as opposed to 34.7% of the legitimate emails. So, all the bi-grams (sequence of 2
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words) following the word ‘your’ were collected along with their frequencies and t-
test was performed to choose appropriate bi-grams as features. Further weights were
calculated for these chosen bi-grams and a final set was formed with the bi-grams
having weights above the set threshold. This set was called PROPERTY. Similarly,
they worked with all the words in sentences having a hyperlink or any word from the
set: ‘url’, ‘link’, ‘website’. After t-test and weight calculation, the resulting set was
called ACTION. The text in the subject field of the emails were also collected. The
stopwords were removed from the subject and t-test was performed on the remaining
words to select the features forming the set PH-SUB.
4.2 Preliminaries
Some terms used further in this chapter are closely related to Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP). We describe them briefly here for a better understanding of the reader.
Word Sense refers to the particular sense or meaning of a word, among its dif-
ferent meanings, that is used in a particular sentence. It is important to understand
the complete meaning of the sentence. For example, in case of the word ’bank’, it
needs to be clear whether it means the financial institution or the sides of a river.
Named Entity refers to the parts of texts that are nouns belonging to different
categories like person, place, organization, etc.
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Hyponym simply means a more specific term. It is closely related to the concept
of hypernym which refers to a more general term in terms of the meaning of the word.
For example spoon is a type of or a more specific form of cutlery. Hence, spoon is
the hyponym of cutlery and cutlery is the hypernym of spoon.
Their system consisted of four different classifiers:
Classifier 1: Pattern Matching (PM)
Classifier 2: PM + Part of speech (POS) Tagging
Classifier 3: PM + POS + Word Senses
Classifier 4: PM + POS + Word Senses + WordNet
Pattern Matching involved two subclassifiers: Action-detector and Nonsensical-
detector. Action detector marked an email as phishing if it has: i) the word ‘your’
followed by a bi-gram belonging to PROPERTY (for example, ‘your credit card’),
and ii) a word from ACTION in a sentence containing a hyperlink or any word
from set: ‘url’, ‘link’, ‘website’. All of these words were selected irrespective of the
cases, i.e. both upper and lower case versions were considered. Nonsensical detector
checked if the email subject has at least a named-entity, or a word from PH-SUB.
If so, the email was marked as phishing if i) it contains at least one link, and ii) its
text is not similar to the subject.
They provided the definition of ‘similar’ as follows: An email body text is similar
to its subject if all of the words in the subject (excluding stopwords) are present in
the email’s text.
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PM + POS Tagging classifier build on the previous one by using part of
speech tags. Bi-grams not containing a noun or a named-entity are removed before
forming the set PROPERTY. Similarly, words that are not verbs are excluded from
the analysis for set ACTION and only named-entities, nouns, verbs, adverbs and
adjectives were used for making the set PH-SUB.
PM + POS Tagging + Word Senses extended the classifier 2 by including
the senses of words using SenseLearner [29]. The statistical analysis was performed
on words with their POS tags and senses.
PM + POS Tagging + Word Senses + WordNet is the final classifier and
it works by extending the sets ACTION, PROPERTY and PH-SUB by computing
the synonyms and the direct hyponyms of the synonyms of each selected feature in
the sets. Wordnet is used to get the synonyms and the direct hyponyms in this case.
4.3 Enhancement
Apart from re-implementing the above mentioned system, some observations and
minor enhancements were also made. First of all the selected bi-grams were the ones
occurring after you, yours, your’s so that the phishing emails having these variations
of the word ‘your’ may also get detected. Also for the Action-detector, the sentences
having the words: site and hyperlink were also included in the analysis process.
We wanted to study the combined effect of different classifiers so we performed a
grand experiment involving the following classifiers:
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4.4 Semantic Feature Selection Pattern Matching
Pattern Matching as explained above.
4.5 PhishNet-NLP Enhanced Header Analysis
The header analysis as proposed in [41] was used along with some modifications. In
the mentioned paper, the authenticity of the email was checked using a matching
technique. If the first Received From field had the same domain as From or localhost
or current email account or forwarding email account or Received SPF address then
email was marked legitimate else, phishing. As an enhancement, more fields like
the CC field, the BCC field and the Message-ID field domains were included while
matching the Received From field domain. Another check was added so that if the
Received From field domain is different from the ones before and after it, both of
which are same, the email is marked as phishing. For example if the email goes
from domain a.relay.com to b.relay.com to a.relay.com again, it is suspicious and the
email is marked phishing. This is to support the fact that a legitimate email will not
contain such cycles where it leaves a domain and then reenters after going through
some other domain.
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4.6 Phish-IDetector
In Phish-IDetector, as explained in chapter 4, the Message-IDs are extracted from
all the emails. Features are extracted using N-gram analysis and the classification is
dome using machine learning classifiers in Weka.
4.7 Results Collation
For combining the results from these classifiers we used majority voting. Table 4.1
shows the results for the set of emails for which all 3 classifiers had predictions. Table
4.2 shows the results for the complete datasets. Some of these emails did not have
predictions from all 3 classes. For these emails, the final class was decided as the
prediction from Phish-IDetector since it had the highest TPR.
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Table 4.1: The Collated Results for the Emails classified by all 3 classifiers
All3Present
Dataset Phish Legitimate Total TPR FPR
EasyHam 5 1511 1516 99.67 0.33
EasyHam1 17 733 750 97.733 2.267
EasyHam2 9 412 421 97.862 2.138
HardHam 6 144 150 96 4
HardHam1 1 74 75 98.667 1.333
EasyHamPhish 1306 27 1333 97.974 2.026
EasyHam1Phish 1315 18 1333 98.65 1.35
EasyHam2Phish 1315 18 1333 98.65 1.35
HardHamPhish 1315 18 1333 98.65 1.35
HardHam1Phish 1315 18 1333 98.645 1.35
Table 4.2: The Collated Results for All Datasets
Dataset Phish Legitimate Total TPR FPR
EasyHam 15 5036 5051 99.703 0.297
EasyHam1 134 2366 2500 94.64 5.36
EasyHam2 55 1345 1400 96.071 3.928
HardHam 7 493 500 98.6 1.4
HardHam1 2 248 250 99.2 0.8
EasyHamPhish 4335 215 4550 95.275 4.725
EasyHam1Phish 4517 33 4550 99.275 0.725
EasyHam2Phish 4528 22 4550 99.516 0.484
HardHamPhish 4529 21 4550 99.538 0.462
HardHam1Phish 4529 21 4550 99.538 0.462
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Chapter 5
Header-Domain Analysis
As mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, each email contains information about the path it
has traveled from the sender to the receiver. The domains in the header fields give
a good approximation of this path. This header field is a string following a certain
basic format. It also contains information which can be used to trace the path of
the email. The domains closer to the receiver’s side cannot be altered easily and it
provides important information about the trail the email has followed. Figure 5.1
shows an example of an email header with the header domains.
5.1 Prediction
Studying the mechanism of email transfer and delivery closely, we find that each
email can provide us with information to trace its path. Also, we feel the domain
headers [Please refer Chapter 2 for description.] give a good indication of this path.
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Our prediction is that the string of all the domain headers in an email would show
signs of obfuscation in case of phishing emails where the phisher is tricking users to
believe that the email has come from an authentic source. Also, since phishers are
distributed across the world, the header domains can indicate the path and hence
their location which could be key to distinguishing them from the legitimate senders.
Furthermore, it may be that phishers could use source routing for the emails, where
they fix the path for the emails in advance using available open smtp servers resulting
in same or similar paths for the phishing emails. Once a path or a part of the path
in the form of domain names is found to be associated with phishing emails, another
email with the same path will most likely be phish as well. To test our hypothesis we
chose to combine two of the most popular and effective techniques of phishing email
classification: n-gram analysis [25], [22], [39] and machine learning [16], [20], [1].
5.2 The Overall Approach
The main aim being classification of emails as phishing or legitimate, our approach
works using n-gram analysis of the string of domain names present in the header
of the emails. Using popular machine-learning classifiers proved to be effective for
phishing email classification, we obtain good results. The method used for classifi-
cation was chosen to be 10-fold cross validation due to its known effectiveness and
universal acceptance. The advantage of our system is its combination of simplicity
and effectiveness. Though minimal information is required and the whole process in-
volves no complex steps, the results are promising. Since we used different datasets
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from various sources [described in Section 5.4.] and still got consistent results, it
proves the robustness of our method.
Apart from the domains, we derive information about the email’s path [Please
refer to Chapter 8 for details] by using four different types of analyses.
Finally we conduct several experiments involving n-gram features from the header
domains.
5.3 Architecture
Our system consists of the following main components. Figure 5.2 is a diagrammatic
representation of our system. The individual components are summarized below.
5.3.1 Domain Extraction Component
This component is responsible for extracting the domains from the email headers.
The raw emails with full headers serve as the input. As mentioned, the string of
header fields contain information about an email’s path. Some of the header fields
have this information in the format of an email address like LHS@RHS, and we
extract extract only the RHS part to get the domain names. Other fields have just
the domain name and we extract the full domains. All the domain names are collected
from each email and stored in a single string, separated by commas. The string is the
output of this component. For example in the header shown in Figure 5.1, the string
will include these domains: citizensbank.com, login.monkey.org, mail1.monkey.org,
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funky.monkey.org, mail2.monkey.org, and so on. TLD Removal: We formed new
datasets by removing the (Top Level Domains) TLDs from the collected domains to
get rid of any bias caused due to the TLD differences between the legitimate and
phishing datsets. The results did deteriorate but only a little which shows that the
TLD difference had a very small contribution in the classification success. A more
detailed analysis is done in section 5.7.
5.3.2 Data File Creation Component
After the domain extraction is done, this component handles the creation of the
data file, which consists of the class information for all the emails along with their
respective header domains string. For each email we determined the given label based
on the dataset, i.e., “phishing” or “legit” (legitimate) class and put the extracted
domain headers beside each label. Hence, we create a csv file with two columns.
First containing the class label and the second containing a single string of header
domains for each email.
5.3.3 N-gram Analysis Component
Next, the n-gram analysis component takes the output csv file from the previous
component and performs n-gram analysis on the information. We decided to do
n-gram analysis of the collected header domains, as this kind of analysis is able to
capture the structure present in any text or string. Also, this method enabled us to
represent the data in numeric format acceptable to most classifiers in Weka. This
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analysis generates unique n-gram features represented as Unicode code point of the
characters. For example, the Unicode code point for “a” is 97 so the 1-gram “a” will
be represented as 97. The feature extracted is the frequency of the n-gram in the
header domains. Hence, the original data collected was transformed and represented
in the arff format. The arff files were also converted to .svm format, the input format
for the confidence weighted algorithm [28], using a python script.
5.3.4 Classification Component
Once we obtained and represented the data in arff format, we passed it on to the
classification component. Here the following seven classifiers were run on the arff file
using Weka 3.6: RF, J48, Bagging, AttSel, SMO, BLR and NBMultinomial. The
confidence weighted algorithm mentioned in Chapter 3 was also used for classifica-
tion.
5.4 Data Sets and Classifiers
We have used two publicly available datasets and two datasets collected from volun-
teers. Email header domains were collected from these datasets separately. In total
we had 3392 phishing emails from a private dataset created by Dr. Jose Nazario [31],
2949 legitimate emails from [14] 197 phishing and 4986 legitimate emails from one
of the author’s inbox.
We ran experiments on combinations of the phishing emails sets combined with
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each of the above mentioned sets of legitimate emails and experimented with both
balanced datasets as well as unbalanced datasets to study the effect on the results.
For the unbalanced datasets we had some with more phishing emails than legitimate
and some vice versa. These datasets are named according to the sets involved in
creating the final dataset. The names and description of the datasets are given
below.
5.4.1 Unbalanced Datasets
1. CSDMCNPN
2. CSDMCRV
3. RVLNPN
4. RVLRV
5.4.2 Balanced Datasets
1. BalCSDMCNPN (2949 legit and phish emails each)
2. BalCSDMCRV (197 legit and phish emails each)
3. BalRVLNPN (3392 legit and phish emails each)
4. BalRVLRV (197 legit and phish emails each)
We used Weka version 3.6 which is basically a collection of machine learning
algorithms for data mining tasks. It was chosen because of its wide acceptability,
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popularity and its ease of use. It has previously been used for phishing detection by
[20] and [11]. Weka provided us an easy method of comparing the performance of
several classifiers on our datasets and choosing the best among them. We ran the
experiments with around 7 classifiers and chose the best among them. Each of them
is explained here in brief.
Random Forest (RF) classifier [Please refer Chapter 3].
J48 [Please refer Chapter 3].
SMO [Please refer Chapter 3].
Bootstrap Aggregating or Bagging [Please refer Chapter 3].
AttributeselectedClassifer This (AttSel) classifier first does attribute selec-
tion and reduces the dimensionality of the training and testing sets before running
the classifier. It is useful in removing redundant attributes and thus improving clas-
sification. We used the default options for this classifier in our experiments.
BayesianLogisticRegression (BLR) is an implementation of bayesian logistic
regression for both Gaussian and Laplace priors and more details can be found at
[18].
NaiveBayes (NB) [Please refer Chapter 3].
Apart from Weka, we also used an online confidence weighted algorithm for classi-
fication [28]. The main advantage of an online learning algorithm is its speed. Being
much faster than Weka, we were able to classify even higher order n-gram files using
confidence weighted algorithm. Since online algorithms have the capability to learn
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from each instance and then discard it immediately, without storing the whole set of
instances, it can run much faster than the batch algorithms. Specially in our case,
where the feature set increases exponentially for every higher n-gram, it was a great
option.
5.5 Experiment Including IPs in Domains
The first set of experiments involved only the domains from the emails and not the
IP addresses contained in them. We realized that this would result in loss of data
and eventually sub standard results. So we repeated the experiments taking the IPs
in the header into account. This did result in the increase in processing time since
the extra step of extracting domain from IP was added.
5.6 Results
The results for the various experiments conducted are summarized in this section.
Tables 5.1 to 5.5 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
balanced dataset RVLNPN with full domains. Results till 5-grams are reported here.
These show that for some classifiers like NBMultinomial the detection improves with
higher order n-grams whereas for some classifiers like SMO and RF performance
slightly decreases as n-gram order increases.
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Figure 5.1: An Email Header With Header Domains
Table 5.1: 1gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
1gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 1 0
42
Figure 5.2: Architecture of Header Domain Analysis System
Table 5.2: 2gramFullDomainBalRVLNPN
2gramFullDomainBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
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Table 5.3: 3gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
3gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.4: 4gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
4gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.002
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.5: 5gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
5gramFullDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.002
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
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Tables 5.6 to 5.10 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the balanced dataset RVLNPN having domains without TLDs. Results till 5-grams
are reported here. These show that for some classifiers like NBMultinomial and BLR
the detection improves with higher order n-grams whereas for some classifiers like
AttSel performance slightly decreases as n-gram order increases.
Tables 5.11 to 5.15 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
unbalanced dataset RVLNPN having full domains. Results till 5-grams are reported
here. These show that for some classifiers like AttSel the detection improves with
higher order n-grams whereas for some classifiers like BLR and SMO performance
slightly decreases as n-gram order increases.
Tables 5.16 to 5.20 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the unbalanced dataset RVLNPN having domains without TLDs. Results till 5-
grams are reported here. These show that for some classifiers like BLR and SMO
the detection improves with higher order n-grams whereas performance does not
decreases as n-gram order increases for any of the classifiers.
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Table 5.6: 1gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
1gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.7: 2gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
2gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.8: 3gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
3gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.002
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
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Table 5.9: 4gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
4gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.002
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.10: 5gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
5gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.002
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.11: 1gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
1gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.999 0.001
Bagging 1 0.001
J48 1 0
RF 1 0.001
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Table 5.12: 2gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
2gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 1 0.001
AttSel 1 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 1 0
Table 5.13: 3gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
3gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.001
SMO 1 0.001
AttSel 1 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 1 0.001
Table 5.14: 4gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
4gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.001
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 1 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
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Table 5.15: 5gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
5gramFullDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.001
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 1 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.16: 1gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
1gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.996 0.004
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 1 0
Table 5.17: 2gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
2gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.999 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0
RF 1 0
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Table 5.18: 3gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
3gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.999 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0
J48 0.999 0
RF 1 0
Table 5.19: 4gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
4gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.999 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0
J48 0.999 0
RF 1 0
Table 5.20: 5gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
5gramNoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.003
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.999 0.001
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0
RF 1 0
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Table 5.21: 1gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
1gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.998 0.002
NBMultinomial 0.987 0.013
SMO 0.998 0.002
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.994 0.006
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.22: 2gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
2gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.996 0.004
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.997 0.003
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.23: 3gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
3gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
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Tables 5.21 to 5.25 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
balanced dataset CSDMCNPN having full domains. Results till 5-grams are reported
here. These show that for some classifiers like BLR and SMO the detection improves
with higher order n-grams whereas performance does not decreases as n-gram order
increases for any of the classifiers.
Tables 5.26 to 5.30 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
balanced dataset CSDMCNPN having domains with no TLD. Results till 5-grams
are reported here. These show that for some classifiers like BLR and NBMultinomial
the detection improves with higher order n-grams whereas performance does not
decreases as n-gram order increases for any of the classifiers.
Tables 5.31 to 3.35 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the unbalanced dataset CSDMCNPN having full domains. Results till 5-grams are
reported here. These show that for some classifiers like BLR and SMO the detection
improves with higher order n-grams whereas performance does not decreases as n-
gram order increases for any of the classifiers.
Tables 5.36 to 5.40 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the balanced dataset CSDMCNPN having domains with no TLD. Results till 5-
grams are reported here. These show that for some classifiers like BLR and SMO
the detection improves with higher order n-grams whereas performance does not
decreases as n-gram order increases for any of the classifiers.
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Table 5.24: 4gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
4gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.25: 5gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
5gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.26: 1gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
1gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.998 0.002
NBMultinomial 0.991 0.009
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.987 0.013
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.999 0.001
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Table 5.27: 2gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
2gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.28: 3gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
3gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.29: 4gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
4gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
54
Table 5.30: 5gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
5gramNoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.998 0.002
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.999 0.001
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.31: 1gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
1gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.998 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.987 0.012
SMO 0.998 0.001
AttSel 0.994 0.007
Bagging 0.998 0.001
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.32: 2gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
2gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.998 0.002
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 0.999 0.001
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Table 5.33: 3gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
3gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.34: 4gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
4gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 0.999 0.001
Table 5.35: 5gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
5gramFullDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.999 0.001
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.003
SMO 0.999 0.001
AttSel 0.997 0.003
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 0.999 0.001
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Table 5.36: 1gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
1gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.998 0.002
NBMultinomial 0.986 0.006
SMO 0.999 0
AttSel 0.99 0.019
Bagging 0.999 0.002
J48 0.998 0.003
RF 1 0
Table 5.37: 2gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
2gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.002
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.995 0.008
Bagging 0.999 0.001
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 1 0
Table 5.38: 3gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
3gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.002
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.997 0.007
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 1 0
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Table 5.39: 4gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
4gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.997 0.002
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.997 0.007
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 1 0
Table 5.40: 5gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
5gramNoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.996 0.002
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.997 0.007
Bagging 0.998 0.002
J48 0.998 0.002
RF 1 0
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Tables 5.41 to 5.45 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the balanced dataset RVLRV having full domains. Results till 5-grams are reported
here. These show very poor performance and the reason could be that all the emails
are from the same individuals account and for almost all of them the source as well
as the destination domains are the same.
Tables 5.46 to 5.50 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the balanced dataset RVLRV having domains with no TLD. Results till 5-grams are
reported here. These show very poor performance and the reason could be that all
the emails are from the same individuals account and for almost all of them the
source as well as the destination domains are the same.
Tables 5.51 to 5.55 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments
on the unbalanced dataset RVLRV having full domains. Results till 5-grams are
reported here. These show much better results than the balanced dataset because
the distribution of legitimate and phishing emails are very skewed with only 197
phishing emails vs. 4986 Legitimate ones.
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Table 5.41: 1gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
1gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.508 0.492
NBMultinomial 0.5 0.5
SMO 0.495 0.505
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.508 0.492
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.503 0.497
Table 5.42: 2gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
2gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.505 0.495
NBMultinomial 0.5 0.5
SMO 0.503 0.497
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.503 0.497
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.495 0.505
Table 5.43: 3gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
3gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.505 0.495
NBMultinomial 0.5 0.5
SMO 0.5 0.5
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.503 0.497
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.503 0.497
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Table 5.44: 4gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
4gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.505 0.495
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.503 0.497
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.503 0.497
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.503 0.497
Table 5.45: 5gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
5gramFullDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.505 0.495
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.508 0.492
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.503 0.497
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.497 0.503
Table 5.46: 1gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
1gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.497 0.503
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.5 0.5
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.5 0.5
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.497 0.503
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Table 5.47: 2gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
2gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.503 0.497
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.5 0.5
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.5 0.5
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.497 0.503
Table 5.48: 3gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
3gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.503 0.497
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.5 0.5
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.5 0.5
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.497 0.503
Table 5.49: 4gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
4gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.5 0.5
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.505 0.495
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.5 0.5
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.495 0.505
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Table 5.50: 5gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
5gramNoTLDDomainsBalRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.5 0.5
NBMultinomial 0.505 0.495
SMO 0.495 0.505
AttSel 0.492 0.508
Bagging 0.5 0.5
J48 0.492 0.508
RF 0.495 0.505
Table 5.51: 1gramFullDomainsRVLRV
1gramFullDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.958 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
Table 5.52: 2gramFullDomainsRVLRV
2gramFullDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.954 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
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Table 5.53: 3gramFullDomainsRVLRV
3gramFullDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.954 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
Table 5.54: 4gramFullDomainsRVLRV
4gramFullDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.954 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
Table 5.55: 5gramFullDomainsRVLRV
5gramFullDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.954 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
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Table 5.56: 1gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
1gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.959 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
Table 5.57: 2gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
2gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.959 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
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Tables 5.56 to 5.60 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
unbalanced dataset RVLRV having domains with no TLD. Results till 5-grams are
reported here. These show much better results than the balanced dataset because
the distribution of legitimate and phishing emails are very skewed with only 197
phishing emails vs 4986 Legitimate ones.
Tables 5.61 to 5.65 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the unbalanced dataset CSDMCRV having full domains. Results till 5-grams are
reported here. These results show that the detection rates are fairly constant for all
classifiers.
Tables 5.66 to 5.70 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
unbalanced dataset CSDMCRV having domains with no TLD. Results till 5-grams
are reported here. These results show that the detection rates are fairly constant for
all classifiers.
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Table 5.58: 3gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
3gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.959 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
Table 5.59: 4gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
4gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.959 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
Table 5.60: 5gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
5gramNoTLDDomainsRVLRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 0.962 0.962
NBMultinomial 0.959 0.962
SMO 0.962 0.962
AttSel 0.962 0.962
Bagging 0.962 0.962
J48 0.962 0.962
RF 0.962 0.962
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Table 5.61: 1gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
1gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.62: 2gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
2gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 1 0
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.63: 3gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
3gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
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Table 5.64: 4gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
4gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.65: 5gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
5gramFullDomainsBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.66: 1gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
1gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.995 0.005
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
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Table 5.67: 2gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
2gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.992 0.008
Bagging 0.992 0.008
J48 0.992 0.008
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.68: 3gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
3gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.69: 4gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
4gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
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Table 5.70: 5gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
5gramNoTLDBalCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 0.997 0.003
AttSel 0.995 0.005
Bagging 0.995 0.005
J48 0.995 0.005
RF 0.997 0.003
Table 5.71: 1gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
1gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
Table 5.72: 2gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
2gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.999 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
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Table 5.73: 3gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
3gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.998 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
Table 5.74: 4gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
4gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.994 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
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Tables 5.71 to 5.75 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on
the unbalanced dataset CSDMCRV having full domains. Results till 5-grams are
reported here. These results show that the detection rates are fairly constant for all
classifiers except NBMultinomial.
Tables 5.76 to 5.80 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the experiments on the
unbalanced dataset CSDMCRV having domains with no TLD. Results till 5-grams
are reported here. These results show that the detection rates are fairly constant for
all classifiers except NBMultinomial.
Tables 5.81 and 5.82 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the Confidence-
Weighted algorithm experiments on the balanced and unbalanced dataset CSDMC-
NPN having domains with no TLD. Results till 10-grams are reported here. These
results show that the detection rates are fairly constant for all n-grams.
Tables 5.83 and 5.84 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the Confidence-
Weighted algorithm experiments on the balanced and unbalanced dataset CSDM-
CNPN having full domains. Results till 10-grams are reported here. These results
show that the detection rates are fairly constant for all n-grams.
Tables 5.85 and 5.86 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the Confidence-
Weighted algorithm experiments on the balanced and unbalanced dataset RVLNPN
having full domains. Results till 10-grams are reported here. These results show
that the detection rates are fairly constant for all n-grams.
Tables 5.87 and 5.88 summarize the TPR and FPR values of the Confidence-
Weighted algorithm experiments on the balanced and unbalanced dataset RVLNPN
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having domains with no TLD. Results till 10-grams are reported here. These results
show that the detection rates are fairly constant for all n-grams.
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Table 5.75: 5gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
5gramFullDomainsCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.988 0.001
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
Table 5.76: 1gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
1gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 1 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
Table 5.77: 2gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
2gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.999 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
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Table 5.78: 3gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
3gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.994 0
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
Table 5.79: 4gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
4gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.988 0.001
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
Table 5.80: 5gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
5gramNoTLDCSDMCRV
Classifier TP Rate FP Rate
BLR 1 0
NBMultinomial 0.983 0.001
SMO 1 0.005
AttSel 1 0.005
Bagging 1 0.005
J48 1 0.005
RF 1 0.005
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Table 5.81: Confidence-Weighted Results for NoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
NoTLDDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.997965412 0.00169549
2 1 0.00169549
3 1 0.00169549
4 1 0.00169549
5 1 0.00169549
6 1 0.00169549
7 1 0.00169549
8 1 0.00169549
9 1 0.00169549
10 1 0.00169549
Table 5.82: Confidence-Weighted Results for NoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
NoTLDDomainsCSDMCNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.998643608 0.000147406
2 1 0
3 1 0
4 1 0
5 1 0
6 1 0.000294811
7 1 0.000294811
8 1 0.000294811
9 1 0
10 1 0
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Table 5.83: Confidence-Weighted Results for FullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
FullDomainsBalCSDMCNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.999660902 0.001356392
2 0.799392097 0.199523323
3 1 0.001356392
4 1 0.001356392
5 1 0.001356392
6 1 0.001356392
7 1 0.001356392
8 1 0.001356392
9 1 0.001356392
10 1 0.001356392
Table 5.84: Confidence-Weighted Results for FullDomainsCSDMCNPN
FullDomainsCSDMCNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.99830451 0.000147406
2 1 0
3 1 0
4 1 0
5 1 0
6 1 0
7 1 0.000294811
8 1 0.000294811
9 1 0
10 1 0
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Table 5.85: Confidence-Weighted Results for FullDomainsBalRVLNPN
FullDomainsBalRVLNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.999115566 0.000589623
2 1 0.001356392
3 0.598996656 0.399587345
4 1 0.001356392
5 1 0.001356392
6 1 0.001356392
7 1 0.001356392
8 1 0.001356392
9 1 0.001356392
10 1 0.001356392
Table 5.86: Confidence-Weighted Results for FullDomainsRVLNPN
FullDomainsRVLNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.999115566 0.000589623
2 1 0.001356392
3 0.598996656 0.399587345
4 1 0.001356392
5 1 0.001356392
6 1 0.001356392
7 1 0.001356392
8 1 0.001356392
9 1 0.001356392
10 1 0.001356392
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Table 5.87: Confidence-Weighted Results for NoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
NoTLDDomainsBalRVLNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 1 0.000589623
2 1 0.000294811
3 0.999410377 0.000884434
4 1 0.000589623
5 0.999410377 0.000589623
6 1 0.000294811
7 1 0.000589623
8 1 0.000589623
9 1 0.000589623
10 0.799822852 0.200765381
Table 5.88: Confidence-Weighted Results for NoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
NoTLDDomainsRVLNPN
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 0.999598877 0
2 1 0
3 1 0
4 0.999598877 0.000589623
5 1 0.000294811
6 1 0
7 0.631010265 0.238378639
8 1 0
9 0.6332907 0.241702398
10 1 0
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Table 5.89: Results for 1-gram features of the full domains dataset
1gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.996 0.004 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.004 0.991 0.996 0.994 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.996 0.004 0.996 0.996 0.996 1
legit AttSel 0.998 0.074 0.968 0.998 0.983 0.962
phish AttSel 0.926 0.002 0.995 0.926 0.959 0.962
Wghtd AttSel 0.976 0.051 0.976 0.976 0.975 0.962
legit Bagging 1 0.001 0.999 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.969
phish BLR 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.967 0.969
Wghtd BLR 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.969
legit J48 0.998 0.001 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.999
phish J48 0.999 0.002 0.995 0.999 0.997 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.998 0.001 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.999
legit NB 0.998 0.074 0.968 0.998 0.983 0.967
phish NB 0.926 0.002 0.995 0.926 0.959 0.991
Wghtd NB 0.976 0.051 0.976 0.976 0.975 0.975
legit RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 1 1
Wghtd RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.90: Results for 2-gram features of the full domains dataset
2gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 1 0.074 0.968 1 0.983 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.98
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.974
legit RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.91: Results for 3-gram features of the full domains dataset
3gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 0.999 0.074 0.968 0.999 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0.001 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.98
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.977 0.977 0.976 0.974
legit RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
83
Table 5.92: Results for 4-gram features of the full domains dataset
4gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 0.999 0.074 0.968 0.999 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0.001 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.977 0.977 0.976 0.973
legit RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Tables 5.89 to 5.98 summarize the results of the weka experiments on the com-
bined dataset CSDMCRVL+NPNRV having full domains. Results till 10-grams are
reported here. These results show that the detection rates are fairly constant for all
n-grams.
Tables 5.99 to 5.108 summarize the results of the weka experiments on the com-
bined dataset CSDMCRVL+NPNRV having domains with no TLD. Results till 10-
grams are reported here. These results show that the detection rates are fairly
constant for all n-grams.
Tables 5.109 and 5.110 summarize the results of the Confidence Weighted Algo-
rithm experiments on the combined dataset CSDMCRVL+NPNRV having domains
with no TLD. Results till 10-grams are reported here. These results show that the
detection rates are fairly constant for all n-grams.
5.7 Information Gain
Since n-gram analysis results in creation of a very high number of features, we de-
cided to find out which features were the most contributing ones towards the final
classification. We selected the top 25 features according to their information gain
values. Tables 5.111 and 5.112 show the features with their respective information
gain values. These values clearly show a pattern that the domains with uh.edu in
them were easily separable from the others. This is because of a large number of
emails of the contributor having this particular domain segment.
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Table 5.93: Results for 5-gram features of the full domains dataset
5gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 0.999 0.074 0.968 0.999 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0.001 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.977 0.977 0.976 0.973
legit RF 1 0.001 0.999 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.94: Results for 6-gram features of the full domains dataset
6gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 1 0.074 0.968 1 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.973
legit RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.95: Results for 7-gram features of the full domains dataset
7gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 1 0.074 0.968 1 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.973
legit RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.96: Results for 8-gram features of the full domains dataset
8gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 1 0.074 0.968 1 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.973
legit RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 1 1
Wghtd RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.97: Results for 9-gram features of the full domains dataset
9gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 1 0.074 0.968 1 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.973
legit RF 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish RF 0.999 0 1 0.999 1 1
Wghtd RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.98: Results for 10-gram features of the full domains dataset
10gramFullDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.004 0.998 0.999 0.999 1
phish ABoost 0.996 0.001 0.998 0.996 0.997 1
Wghtd ABoost 0.998 0.003 0.998 0.998 0.998 1
legit AttSel 1 0.004 0.998 1 0.999 0.998
phish AttSel 0.996 0 0.999 0.996 0.998 0.998
Wghtd AttSel 0.999 0.003 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998
legit Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
phish Bagging 0.999 0 1 0.999 0.999 1
Wghtd Bagging 1 0.001 1 1 1 1
legit BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd BLR 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit J48 1 0.002 0.999 1 1 0.999
phish J48 0.998 0 1 0.998 0.999 0.999
Wghtd J48 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
legit NB 1 0.074 0.968 1 0.983 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0 0.999 0.926 0.961 0.979
Wghtd NB 0.977 0.051 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.973
legit RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd RF 1 0 1 1 1 1
legit SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
phish SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
Wghtd SMO 1 0 1 1 1 1
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Table 5.99: Results for 1-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
1gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.999 0.074 0.967 0.999 0.983 0.98
phish ABoost 0.926 0.001 0.997 0.926 0.96 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.976 0.052 0.977 0.976 0.976 0.98
legit AttSel 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.969
phish AttSel 0.941 0.003 0.992 0.941 0.966 0.969
Wghtd AttSel 0.979 0.042 0.98 0.979 0.979 0.969
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.982
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.982
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.982
legit BLR 0.999 0.059 0.974 0.999 0.987 0.97
phish BLR 0.941 0.001 0.998 0.941 0.969 0.97
Wghtd BLR 0.981 0.041 0.982 0.981 0.981 0.97
legit J48 0.999 0.056 0.975 0.999 0.987 0.981
phish J48 0.944 0.001 0.997 0.944 0.97 0.981
Wghtd J48 0.982 0.039 0.982 0.982 0.981 0.981
legit NB 0.996 0.074 0.968 0.996 0.981 0.966
phish NB 0.926 0.004 0.99 0.926 0.957 0.96
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.975 0.974 0.974 0.964
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.971 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 0.999 0.055 0.976 0.999 0.987 0.972
phish SMO 0.945 0.001 0.998 0.945 0.971 0.972
Wghtd SMO 0.982 0.038 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.972
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Table 5.100: Results for 2-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
2gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.983
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.983
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.983
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.962
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.968
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.971 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.101: Results for 3-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
3gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.983
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.983
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.983
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.971
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.962
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.968
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.971 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.102: Results for 4-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
4gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish ABoost 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd ABoost 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.983
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.983
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.983
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.967
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.971 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.103: Results for 5-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
5gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.983
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.983
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.983
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.967
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.104: Results for 6-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
6gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.983
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.983
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.983
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.967
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.105: Results for 7-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
7gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit Bagging 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.983
phish Bagging 0.944 0 0.999 0.944 0.971 0.983
Wghtd Bagging 0.982 0.039 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.983
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.967
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.106: Results for 8-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
8gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.967
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.107: Results for 9-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
9gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.074 0.968 0.995 0.981 0.97
phish NB 0.926 0.005 0.989 0.926 0.956 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.974 0.052 0.974 0.974 0.973 0.967
legit RF 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.983
phish RF 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.983
Wghtd RF 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
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Table 5.108: Results for 10-gram features of the domains with no TLD dataset
10gramNoTLDDomainsFromHeader&IPsNoMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.997 0.059 0.974 0.997 0.985 0.98
phish ABoost 0.941 0.003 0.993 0.941 0.966 0.98
Wghtd ABoost 0.98 0.041 0.98 0.98 0.979 0.98
legit AttSel 1 0.059 0.974 1 0.987 0.971
phish AttSel 0.941 0 1 0.941 0.97 0.971
Wghtd AttSel 0.982 0.04 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.971
legit BLR 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish BLR 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd BLR 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
legit J48 1 0.056 0.975 1 0.987 0.978
phish J48 0.944 0 1 0.944 0.971 0.978
Wghtd J48 0.983 0.039 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.978
legit NB 0.995 0.059 0.974 0.995 0.984 0.97
phish NB 0.941 0.005 0.989 0.941 0.964 0.961
Wghtd NB 0.978 0.042 0.979 0.978 0.978 0.967
legit SMO 1 0.055 0.976 1 0.988 0.973
phish SMO 0.945 0 1 0.945 0.972 0.973
Wghtd SMO 0.983 0.038 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.973
Table 5.109: Confidence Weighted Algo Results for Full Domains
FullDomainsCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 99.937 0.111
2 100 0.195
3 99.986 0.195
4 99.987 0.195
5 99.987 0.195
6 99.987 0.195
7 99.987 0.195
8 99.987 0.195
9 99.987 0.195
10 99.987 0.195
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Table 5.110: Confidence Weighted Algo Results for Full Domains
NoTLDDomainsCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Gram TP Rate FP Rate
1 99.912 5.656
2 93.535 5.155
3 99.987 5.656
4 93.8 5.322
5 99.987 5.656
6 93.699 4.96
7 99.987 5.656
8 93.938 5.183
9 99.987 5.656
10 93.585 5.183
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5.8 Comparative Analysis
We make a direct comparison with Phish-IDetector, a system which uses ngram
analysis on Message-IDs of the emails. For this purpose we have extracted header
domains excluding the Message-ID header for the header domain analysis and only
the Message-IDs separately. Running experiments on the Message-IDs and the rest of
the header domains reveal that our header domain analysis produces better detection
and greatly reduces the false positive rate. We can thus, infer from these experiments
that the header domains are a better indicator of legitimacy of emails than just the
Message-ID.
There has been some work done in using the SMTP path of an email for clas-
sification [26] but it has only been used for spam detection and not for phishing.
Besides, they only make use of the SMTP path as indicated by the IP addresses
in the Received fields, whereas, we have collected the domains from several headers
besides those like From, Delivered-To, CC etc.
Tables 5.113 and 5.116 summarize the results of the weka experiments on the
combined dataset CSDMCRVL+NPNRV for both RHS and Split Message-ID n-
gram features. Results till 2-grams are reported here. These results show that the
detection rate and false positive rate are slightly better for Split Message-ID than
that for RHS Message-ID datasets.
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5.9 Error Analysis
It is very important to find out how any system can be improved further. We took
a closer look at the misclassifications performed by our classifiers to find out the
shortcomings our technique and what could be done to make it better.
We checked the misclassified emails for both full domains as well as domains with
no TLDs and made some observations. A legitimate email was constantly marked
phish as it did not have enough information in the header. The only domain available
was “cs.uh.edu” and it was insufficient for proper classification.
For the phishing emails some of the wrongly classified emails did not have com-
plete headers and hence ended up providing only single domain, for example, “pay-
pal.com”, “westernunion.com”.
Another important observation was that removing TLDs from the domains caused
information loss and increased the false positive rate. But the false negative rate was
not affected significantly. This means that though some legitimate emails ended up
being classified as phish, the phishing emails were classified as legitimate, which is
of more importance for phishing classifiers. The cost associate with false negatives
is much higher than that associated with false positives.
5.10 Security Analysis
As mentioned, the exponentially increasing file size for higher order n-grams makes
it difficult to run different classifiers on them without using specialized big data
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approaches. We currently ran only the confidence weighted algorithm on higher
order n-gram files, which has proven itself to be competitive in other scenarios, but
not guaranteed to be the ideal choice for best results. Phishers could try to obfuscate
the header domains and try to evade our system, however they cannot change the
entire path of the email. For instance, the Received-From headers closest to the
receiver’s end are not under the control of the sender. Also, the combination of the
domains of the Received-From headers and the other headers would help in case of
such obfuscations.
Aggregating the header domain analysis with the SMTP features would also help
in identifying such cases of obfuscation.
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Table 5.111: Information Gain Values for 5gramFullDomainsBalNazarioPhish-
NewRVL
5gramFullDomainsBalNazarioPhishNewRVL
S.No. IG Feature
1 0.985588 o
2 0.98479 m
3 0.98304 space
4 0.98304 “space
5 0.9811 or
6 0.975533 u
7 0.973901 edu
8 0.973901 .ed
9 0.973901 du
10 0.973901 .e
11 0.973901 .edu
12 0.969608 h.
13 0.969608 uh
14 0.969608 h.e
15 0.969608 uh.e
16 0.969608 uh.ed
17 0.969608 h.ed
18 0.969608 h.edu
19 0.969608 uh.
20 0.968558 s.
21 0.967529 ail
22 0.967529 mai
23 0.967529 mail
24 0.967529 il
25 0.967529 ai
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Table 5.112: Information Gain Values for 5gramNoTLDDomainsBalNazarioPhish-
NewRVL
5gramNoTLDDomainsBalNazarioPhishNewRVL
S.No. IG Feature
1 0.977489 e
2 0.977009 m
3 0.973901 uh
4 0.973352 c
5 0.972813 cs.
6 0.972813 cs
7 0.972813 .u
8 0.972813 .uh
9 0.972813 s.
10 0.972266 o
11 0.969608 cs.uh
12 0.969608 s.u
13 0.969608 s.uh
14 0.969608 cs.u
15 0.96831 s
16 0.967529 il
17 0.967529 ail
18 0.967529 ai
19 0.967529 mail
20 0.967529 mai
21 0.966257 ma
22 0.965111 u
23 0.963732 l
24 0.963428 .cs.
25 0.963428 .cs
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Table 5.113: Results for 1-gram features of the RHS Message-IDs from combined
dataset
1gramRHSCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.94 0.725 0.742 0.94 0.829 0.727
phish ABoost 0.275 0.06 0.676 0.275 0.391 0.727
Wghtd ABoost 0.733 0.518 0.721 0.733 0.693 0.727
legit AttSel 0.959 0.351 0.858 0.959 0.906 0.905
phish AttSel 0.649 0.041 0.878 0.649 0.746 0.905
Wghtd AttSel 0.863 0.254 0.864 0.863 0.856 0.905
legit Bagging 0.974 0.093 0.959 0.974 0.967 0.988
phish Bagging 0.907 0.026 0.941 0.907 0.924 0.988
Wghtd Bagging 0.954 0.072 0.953 0.954 0.953 0.988
legit BLR 0.894 0.53 0.789 0.894 0.838 0.682
phish BLR 0.47 0.106 0.668 0.47 0.552 0.682
Wghtd BLR 0.762 0.398 0.751 0.762 0.749 0.682
legit J48 0.976 0.071 0.968 0.976 0.972 0.984
phish J48 0.929 0.024 0.946 0.929 0.938 0.984
Wghtd J48 0.962 0.056 0.961 0.962 0.961 0.984
legit NB 0.741 0.363 0.819 0.741 0.778 0.767
phish NB 0.637 0.259 0.526 0.637 0.576 0.767
Wghtd NB 0.709 0.33 0.728 0.709 0.715 0.767
legit RF 0.999 0.026 0.988 0.999 0.993 0.998
phish RF 0.974 0.001 0.997 0.974 0.985 0.998
Wghtd RF 0.991 0.019 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.998
legit SMO 0.914 0.583 0.776 0.914 0.84 0.666
phish SMO 0.417 0.086 0.687 0.417 0.519 0.666
Wghtd SMO 0.76 0.428 0.749 0.76 0.74 0.666
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Table 5.114: Results for 2-gram features of the RHS Message-IDs from combined
dataset
2gramRHSCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.995 0.841 0.724 0.995 0.838 0.733
phish ABoost 0.159 0.005 0.934 0.159 0.271 0.733
Wghtd ABoost 0.735 0.581 0.789 0.735 0.662 0.733
legit AttSel 0.94 0.468 0.816 0.94 0.874 0.848
phish AttSel 0.532 0.06 0.799 0.532 0.639 0.848
Wghtd AttSel 0.813 0.341 0.811 0.813 0.8 0.848
legit Bagging 0.98 0.068 0.97 0.98 0.975 0.99
phish Bagging 0.932 0.02 0.955 0.932 0.943 0.99
Wghtd Bagging 0.965 0.053 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.99
legit BLR 0.975 0.114 0.95 0.975 0.962 0.93
phish BLR 0.886 0.025 0.94 0.886 0.913 0.93
Wghtd BLR 0.947 0.086 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.93
legit J48 0.984 0.053 0.976 0.984 0.98 0.992
phish J48 0.947 0.016 0.964 0.947 0.956 0.992
Wghtd J48 0.973 0.041 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.992
legit NB 0.597 0.128 0.912 0.597 0.722 0.82
phish NB 0.872 0.403 0.494 0.872 0.631 0.821
Wghtd NB 0.683 0.213 0.782 0.683 0.693 0.82
legit RF 0.999 0.026 0.988 0.999 0.994 0.998
phish RF 0.974 0.001 0.997 0.974 0.985 0.998
Wghtd RF 0.991 0.018 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.998
legit SMO 0.973 0.137 0.94 0.973 0.956 0.918
phish SMO 0.863 0.027 0.934 0.863 0.898 0.918
Wghtd SMO 0.939 0.103 0.939 0.939 0.938 0.918
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Table 5.115: Results for 1-gram features of the Split Message-IDs from combined
dataset
1gramSplitMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.995 0.95 0.699 0.995 0.821 0.688
phish ABoost 0.05 0.005 0.813 0.05 0.094 0.688
Wghtd ABoost 0.701 0.656 0.734 0.701 0.595 0.688
legit AttSel 0.934 0.589 0.778 0.934 0.849 0.81
phish AttSel 0.411 0.066 0.737 0.411 0.528 0.81
Wghtd AttSel 0.771 0.426 0.765 0.771 0.749 0.81
legit Bagging 0.962 0.139 0.939 0.962 0.95 0.979
phish Bagging 0.861 0.038 0.911 0.861 0.885 0.979
Wghtd Bagging 0.93 0.108 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.979
legit BLR 0.925 0.617 0.768 0.925 0.839 0.654
phish BLR 0.383 0.075 0.697 0.383 0.494 0.654
Wghtd BLR 0.756 0.449 0.746 0.756 0.732 0.654
legit J48 0.965 0.103 0.954 0.965 0.959 0.97
phish J48 0.897 0.035 0.92 0.897 0.908 0.97
Wghtd J48 0.944 0.082 0.943 0.944 0.944 0.97
legit NB 0.404 0.22 0.803 0.404 0.537 0.663
phish NB 0.78 0.596 0.371 0.78 0.503 0.663
Wghtd NB 0.521 0.337 0.668 0.521 0.527 0.663
legit RF 0.997 0.02 0.991 0.997 0.994 1
phish RF 0.98 0.003 0.994 0.98 0.987 1
Wghtd RF 0.992 0.015 0.992 0.992 0.992 1
legit SMO 0.981 0.825 0.725 0.981 0.834 0.578
phish SMO 0.175 0.019 0.808 0.175 0.288 0.578
Wghtd SMO 0.73 0.574 0.751 0.73 0.664 0.578
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Table 5.116: Results for 2-gram features of the Split Message-IDs from combined
dataset
2gramSplitMsgIdCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 1 0.941 0.702 1 0.825 0.706
phish ABoost 0.059 0 0.986 0.059 0.112 0.706
Wghtd ABoost 0.707 0.648 0.79 0.707 0.603 0.706
legit AttSel 0.931 0.358 0.852 0.931 0.89 0.894
phish AttSel 0.642 0.069 0.808 0.642 0.716 0.894
Wghtd AttSel 0.841 0.268 0.838 0.841 0.836 0.894
legit Bagging 0.976 0.105 0.954 0.976 0.965 0.988
phish Bagging 0.895 0.024 0.944 0.895 0.919 0.988
Wghtd Bagging 0.951 0.08 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.988
legit BLR 0.946 0.162 0.928 0.946 0.937 0.892
phish BLR 0.838 0.054 0.875 0.838 0.856 0.892
Wghtd BLR 0.912 0.128 0.912 0.912 0.912 0.892
legit J48 0.981 0.058 0.974 0.981 0.977 0.99
phish J48 0.942 0.019 0.957 0.942 0.95 0.99
Wghtd J48 0.969 0.046 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.99
legit NB 0.516 0.191 0.857 0.516 0.644 0.749
phish NB 0.809 0.484 0.43 0.809 0.562 0.749
Wghtd NB 0.607 0.282 0.724 0.607 0.619 0.749
legit RF 0.999 0.022 0.99 0.999 0.994 1
phish RF 0.978 0.001 0.997 0.978 0.987 1
Wghtd RF 0.992 0.016 0.992 0.992 0.992 1
legit SMO 0.95 0.166 0.927 0.95 0.938 0.892
phish SMO 0.834 0.05 0.883 0.834 0.858 0.892
Wghtd SMO 0.914 0.13 0.913 0.914 0.913 0.892
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Chapter 6
SMTP Analysis
In this thesis, we attempt to go beyond the problem of email classification. The emails
provide us with much more information and we extract these to find out about the
SMTP servers involved in the email relaying process. We attempt to take a look at
the state of the internet through the perspective of emails. We collect the statistics
like the total number of SMTP servers for each email, which is a representation of the
length of its path and the statistics about the percentage of SMTP servers open. The
main aim of this experiment is to determine if the SMTP servers of domains in the
phishing emails are more likely to be open than those of the legitimate emails. This
information would give substantial proof to either support or reject our hypothesis
of phishers using source routing. For every email all the Received-From domains are
extracted and using nslookup command all the smtp servers are collected for each
of those domains. Then the state of each of the smtp servers is checked using nmap
command. Examples of the commands used are as follows:
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nslookup -querytype=mx domainName
where domainName is the Received-From domain
nmap -p25 -PN smtpServer
where smtpServer is the smtp server returned by nslookup
Since this involves determining the state of the SMTP port on the server, and
we use nmap command to do so, here is a list to get familiar with the port states
returned by this command [27].
6.1 States Returned by nmap for SMTP Server
According to [27], the different states returned by nmap command are:
1. open
This indicates that an application is actively accepting TCP connections, UDP
datagrams or SCTP connections on this port. Usually, the purpose of port
scanning is to determine which ports are open. Open ports are exploitable
for security attacks. There is a constant conflict between the attackers an the
administrators as the former tries to exploit and the latter tries to protect
the ports. From a non-security point of view, these scans provide information
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about the services that are present in the network for use.
2. closed
This indicates that the port is accessible (it receives and responds to nmap
probe packets), but no application is listening on it. This gives some informa-
tion like a host is up on an IP address (host discovery, or ping scanning), and
as part of OS detection. Though not active, closed ports are still reachable and
might open in the future, which could be determined using port scanning. To
block such ports from revealing any information, the administrators may use
firewalls.
3. filtered
This indicates that nmap cannot determine whether the port is open because
its probes cannot reach the port because packet filtering prevents it. This
could be due to a dedicated firewall device, router rules, or host-based firewall
software. These ports are very frustrating for the attackers as they provide so
little information because the filters simply drop probes without responding.
Very rarely they respond with ICMP error messages such as type 3 code 13
(destination unreachable: communication administratively prohibited). Usu-
ally the probes are dropped, which slows down the scan dramatically. It forces
nmap to retry several times to check if the probe was dropped due to network
congestion rather than filtering.
4. unfiltered
This indicates that a port is accessible, but nmap cannot determine whether it
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is open or closed. Only the ACK scan, used to map firewall rulesets, designates
ports into this state. Other scan types such as Window scan, SYN scan, or
FIN scan, may provide information whether the port is open.
5. open—filtered
This indicates that nmap is unable to determine whether a port is open or
filtered. This happens for the scans where open ports give no response. The
packet filter could have dropped the probe or any corresponding response so
nmap does not know for sure whether the port is open or being filtered.
6. closed—filtered
This indicates that nmap is unable to determine whether a port is closed or
filtered. It is only used for the IP ID idle scan.
6.2 Three Options for SMTP State
The possible number of states being six in total, we had to decide on the aggregation
of states of each of the SMTP servers for a domain. This would require converting
the states to binary values of open (1) or close (0). We finally used three different
options for the feature creation.
1. Option 1
We keep these granular state information for each SMTP server returned for
the Received-From domains in the header. We combine the name of the server
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with its corresponding state and get n-grams from this combination and use
these n-grams as the features.
2. Option 2: The Strict-Open Assumption
Here, we perform the aggregation of the states of all the SMTP servers returned
by each of the Received-From domains. We converted the states to binary form
by assigning the state 1 to only those SMTP servers which returned ‘open’ state;
all other 5 states are assigned 0. If any of the SMTP server had open state -
1, the corresponding domain was considered to have open state - 1. Again the
domains were combined with the aggregated states and n-gram features were
derived from them.
3. Option 3: The Strict-Closed Assumption
Same as Option 2 but here the states were converted to binary form by assigning
the state 0 to only those SMTP servers which returned ‘close’ state; all other
5 states are assigned 1.
6.3 Inference
Our experiments revealed that none of the SMTP servers were in “open” state.
They were all either “filtered” or nmap failed to resolve the server host name. This
shows that the system administrators are taking care not to leave any SMTP servers
as open relays. However, [6] talks about more sophisticated ways of exploiting an
SMTP server such that it acts as an open relay even when it is actually closed to
outside traffic. A more specialized technique will have to be developed if we want to
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find out about such exploitable SMTP servers.
6.4 SMTP Domains Intersection
The SMTP domains from different datasets had some intersections. For the pairs
of datasets CSDMC+RV, CSDMC+RVL and RVL+NPN there were no intersecting
domains. But for the pairs CSDMC+NPN, RVL+RV and NPN+RV the intersections
have been listed in tables 6.1 - 6.3. The tables show that the frequencies of the
intersecting domains between the legitimate (CSDMC) and phishing (NPN) sets are
much lesser than the frequencies of the intersecting domains between the phishing sets
NPN and RV. The numbers are high for the legitimate + phishing set of RVL+RV
and this is because they are all from the same individual’s inbox.
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Table 6.1: Intersecting SMTP Domains for CSDMC+NPN
CSDMC+NPN
SMTPServer TotalFrequency
hotmail.com 28
eastrmimpo03.cox.net 19
eastrmimpo01.cox.net 18
eastrmimpo02.cox.net 16
eastrmmtao103.cox.net 12
eastrmmtao102.cox.net 11
edge03.upcmail.net 5
smtp.newsguy.com 4
free.fr 3
hrndva-omtalb.mail.rr.com 3
pih-relay04.plus.net 3
smtp-out4.blueyonder.co.uk 3
defout.telus.net 2
edge01.upcmail.net 2
fed1rmimpo03.cox.net 2
fed1rmmtao102.cox.net 2
filter.sfr.fr 2
mail02.svc.cra.dublin.eircom.net 2
Table 6.2: Intersecting SMTP Domains for RVL+RV
RVL+RV
SMTPServer TotalFrequency
dijkstra.cs.uh.edu 11989
smtp3.cc.uh.edu 2161
smtp4.cc.uh.edu 2089
localhost.localdomain 123
yahoogroups.com 24
tx2outboundpool.messaging.microsoft.com 5
edge01.upcmail.net 2
rediffmail.com 2
snt0-omc1-s49.snt0.hotmail.com 2
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Table 6.3: Intersecting SMTP Domains for NPN+RV
NPN+RV
SMTPServer TotalFrequency
localhost.localdomain 123
mta01.xtra.co.nz 10
na01-bl2-obe.outbound.protection.outlook.com 9
yahoo.com 8
google.com 6
DHE-VE07-1.bps-staff.birmingham.k12.mi.us 4
mail.birmingham.k12.mi.us 4
stcexcpsm04.corp.star 4
1e100.net 3
att.net 3
fep14.mx.upcmail.net 3
HMWEXMB07.AD.HISD.ORG 3
MYMAIL.exeter.edu 3
S0-OTT-X1.nrn.nrcan.gc.ca 3
S0-OTT-XSMTP3.nrcan.gc.ca 3
SSFEXCHEDGE02.srunet.sruad.edu 3
stcexcpsm02.corp.star 3
WCCUSDEXCH01.wccusd.net 3
webmail.exeter.edu 3
ADMIN-IMSS01.HOUSTONISD.ORG 2
co1outboundpool.messaging.microsoft.com 2
correo.ult.edu.cu 2
device.lan 2
edge01.upcmail.net 2
howard.edu 2
localhost.com 2
mail2.wccusd.net 2
rediffmail.com 2
toroondcbmts05-srv.bellnexxia.net 2
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Chapter 7
Domain Details
We aimed at performing an Internet-scale study of the current distribution, state and
other properties of the existing SMTP servers. The goal is to build a local database
of SMTP servers by crawling as many IP addresses as possible. However, we start at
a smaller level and use the domains collected from our email datasets. We collect the
following information for each of these domains: Domain Name, IP Address, Query
Time, Query Date, City, State Name, Country, Zip, Latitude, Longitude, ASN, BGP
and State of the SMTP domain. The procedure used to collect these data are as
follows:
Using nslookup, nmap and aggregation as earlier, we determined the main SMTP
server’s state. The state was determined using the Option 3 or the strict closed
assumption. The IP address was obtained using the command : dig +short do-
mainName We used a command line tool called geoiplookup to get the following
information: stateName, cityName, zipCode, latitude, longitude. And finally we
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used the verbose form of whois command from whois.cymru.com to get the follow-
ing: ASN, BGPPrefix, countryName. The query date and time are saved using the
date command.
7.1 Timestamps Visualization
Another interesting factor of the emails that remains unexplored is a time stamps
analysis. Each email is associated with a collection of time stamps as appearing in
the email header. This takes care of the number of hops in the path of the email as
well. We conducted experiments using n-grams from the raw time stamps collection
for each email. This produced very good results. But since the overlap of time spans
of the different phishing and legitimate datasets was negligible, these results are not
dependable.
To visualize the time stamps for each dataset, histograms were created for the
frequency of email at each hour of the day. Since the emails traveled through different
time zones, two types of histograms are formed. One for the local times and another
for the times converted to Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
Tables 7.1 to 7.8 show the frequencies of emails having the time stamps corre-
sponding to the different hours of the day.
Tables 7.9 to 7.16 show the frequencies of emails having the sent time stamps
corresponding to the different hours of the day.
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Figure 7.1: Frequency of Legitimate Emails from CSDMC for Local time
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Figure 7.2: Frequency of Legitimate Emails from CSDMC for UTC
0 5 10 15 20
Hour of the Day (0-23)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
UTC Hour Frequency (CSDMC2010)
123
Figure 7.3: Frequency of Legitimate Emails from RVL for Local time
0 5 10 15 20
Hour of the Day (0-23)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
Localtime Hour Frequency (RVL)
124
Figure 7.4: Frequency of Legitimate Emails from RVL for UTC
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Figure 7.5: Frequency of Phishing Emails from NPN for Local time
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Figure 7.6: Frequency of Phishing Emails from NPN for UTC
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Figure 7.7: Frequency of Phishing Emails from RV for Local time
0 5 10 15 20
Hour of the Day (0-23)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
Localtime Hour Frequency (RV)
128
Figure 7.8: Frequency of Phishing Emails from RV for UTC
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Figure 7.9: Frequency of Legitimate Emails’ Sent Times from CSDMC in Local time
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Figure 7.10: Frequency of Legitimate Emails’ Sent Times from CSDMC in UTC
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Figure 7.11: Frequency of Legitimate Emails’ Sent Times from RVL in Local time
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Figure 7.12: Frequency of Legitimate Emails’ Sent Times from RVL in UTC
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Figure 7.13: Frequency of Phishing Emails’ Sent Times from NPN in Local time
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Figure 7.14: Frequency of Phishing Emails’ Sent Times from NPN in UTC
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Figure 7.15: Frequency of Phishing Emails’ Sent Times from RV in Local time
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Figure 7.16: Frequency of Phishing Emails’ Sent Times from RV in UTC
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Figure 7.17: Frequency of All Legit Emails’ Sent Times in Local time
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Figure 7.18: Frequency of All Legit Emails’ Sent Times in UTC
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Tables 7.17 to 7.20 show the frequencies of all phishing and all legit emails having
the sent time stamps corresponding to the different hours of the day.
Tables 7.17 to 7.20 show the frequencies of all phishing and all legit emails having
the time stamps corresponding to the different hours of the day.
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Figure 7.19: Frequency of All Phishing Emails’ Sent Times in Local time
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Figure 7.20: Frequency of All Phishing Emails’ Sent Times in UTC
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Figure 7.21: Frequency of All Legit Emails for UTC for Local time
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Figure 7.22: Frequency of All Legit Emails for UTC
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Figure 7.23: Frequency of All Phishing Emails for Local time
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Figure 7.24: Frequency of All Phishing Emails for UTC
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Chapter 8
Path Analysis
This chapter deals with the reconstruction of the path taken by the emails. Chapter
5 talks about the supposition that a path once associated with phishing emails is
more likely to be associated with other phishing email and we test it using path
analysis as described here.
As the email is sent, the first mail server or relay that receives it should have
the same domain as the sender. That means the first Received-From domain should
match the From field domain. It is checked whether this condition is met by the
email or not making it a binary feature. Similarly, for other two binary features it
is checked if all ‘by’ domains are present in the Received-From domains and if the
domain matches the accompanying IP in the Received-From field. We also performed
preliminary path analysis to check if the email’s path is broken. To determine the
break in the path we go through the Received-From and ‘by’ pairs in the email
and create the path it traveled using the domains as the vertices or nodes and an
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edge between them representing a connection or the absence of an edge representing
discontinuity. This results in several continuous features related to the path.
These header fields get added to the email in a bottom-up approach. So the first
Received-From field is actually the one in the bottom and the last one is the one at the
top. Hence, the path formed also follows the bottom-up approach. An example can
be seen in the figure 5.2 where the path can be traced as follows: The email was re-
ceived from user-119ac86.biz.mindspring.com by maynard.mail.mindspring.net, from
maynard.mail.mindspring.net by xent.com, from lair.xent.com by xent.com and so
on.
8.1 Subroutines
We tried various ways of extracting from the header information about the path
that an email has taken from the sender to the recipient. Four different checks
were performed and the result converted to features for each email to determine
the legitimacy of the path taken. Before creating the features, we performed the
Comprehensive Extraction of Email Header Information from all the emails.
This included the extraction of all the fields and data that we found relevant for the
purpose of email header analysis. Domains from all the header fields, ESMTPIDs,
Message-IDs, X-Mailer information, X-Spam information, Timestamps, Received-
from and By pairs, would be a good representation of the data extracted. This was
done to facilitate any further header analysis experiments involving the data from
the headers. The four different checks performed are in the form of the following
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subroutines:
8.1.1 From Received-From Mismatch
Ideally, the From field domain of an email should match the domain of the first
Received-From field, i.e., the Received-From closest to the sender. This subroutine
checks if this condition is satisfied. If yes, it returns 0 otherwise 1 which is also the
value of the binary feature ‘From Received-From Mismatch’.
8.1.2 All By in Received-From
The domains following the ‘by’ field in the emails are the ones which have received
the emails. Since they are receiving the emails, it is proper that they become the
next domain from which another domain will receive the email. So, a ‘by’ domain
must also be in the Received-From domain. This subroutine checks if all the ‘by’
fields are present in the Received-From fields. If yes, it returns 0 otherwise 1 which
is also the value of the binary feature ‘All By in Received-From’.
8.1.3 Claiming Domain Different from Actual Domain
Many domains also provide an IP along with them in the email headers. In case of
obfuscation the email might be claiming to be from a domain but actually belong to
another. The subroutine determines if that is the case by checking if the domain from
the given IP matches the given domain. If yes, it returns 0 otherwise 1 which is also
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the value of the binary feature ‘Claiming Domain Different from Actual Domain’.
8.1.4 Path Broken
For this check, we try to recreate the complete chain of edges formed by the from-by
pairs in the email header. We keep track of connected edges where the Received-
From match the previous ‘by’, the disconnected edges where only a From-By pair is
available without any connection to the next edge, and the orphan nodes which are
the domains that are not a part of any From-By edge pairs. We calculate the total
path length, the connected edges count and ratio, the disconnected edges count and
ratio from the path analysis. Also, we derive the number of breaks and the distance
of the first break from the sender. This results in several continuous features as fol-
lows: TotalConnectedEdges, TotalDisjointEdges, TotalOrphanNodes, PathLength,
ConnectedRatio, DisjointRatio, OrphanRatio, BreakPosition1, BreakPosition2 till
maximum number of breaks.
To explain this with a simple example consider the following chain: a-b, b-c, c-d,
e-f, g, h-i, where a, b, c .. i are the domains. Here we can see that the connected
edges are a-b, b-c and c-d. The disconnected edges are e-f and h-i and the orphan
node is g.
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8.2 Results
Table 8.1 summarizes the results of the weka experiments on the combined dataset
CSDMCRVL+NPNRV for the combined features of path analysis. These results
show that the best result is obtained for Random Forest classifier with 93% TPR
and 13.3% FPR.
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Figure 8.1: The received Header Fields of an Email
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Table 8.1: Results for combined features of path analysis
PathAnalysisCombinedCSDMCRVL+NPNRV
Class Classifier TPR FPR Precision Recall FMeasure ROC
legit ABoost 0.819 0.329 0.846 0.819 0.833 0.798
phishing ABoost 0.671 0.181 0.627 0.671 0.648 0.798
Weighted ABoost 0.773 0.283 0.778 0.773 0.775 0.798
legit AttSel 0.902 0.355 0.849 0.902 0.875 0.889
phishing AttSel 0.645 0.098 0.749 0.645 0.693 0.889
Weighted AttSel 0.822 0.275 0.818 0.822 0.818 0.889
legit Bagging 0.981 0.196 0.917 0.981 0.948 0.976
phishing Bagging 0.804 0.019 0.952 0.804 0.872 0.976
Weighted Bagging 0.926 0.14 0.928 0.926 0.924 0.976
legit BLR 0.999 0.981 0.692 0.999 0.818 0.509
phishing BLR 0.019 0.001 0.907 0.019 0.037 0.509
Weighted BLR 0.694 0.676 0.759 0.694 0.575 0.509
legit J48 0.982 0.193 0.919 0.982 0.949 0.971
phishing J48 0.807 0.018 0.952 0.807 0.874 0.971
Weighted J48 0.927 0.138 0.929 0.927 0.926 0.971
legit NB 0.478 0.129 0.891 0.478 0.622 0.768
phishing NB 0.871 0.522 0.43 0.871 0.576 0.768
Weighted NB 0.6 0.251 0.748 0.6 0.608 0.768
legit RF 0.983 0.186 0.921 0.983 0.951 0.981
phishing RF 0.814 0.017 0.955 0.814 0.879 0.981
Weighted RF 0.93 0.133 0.932 0.93 0.929 0.981
legit SMO 0.969 0.782 0.733 0.969 0.834 0.593
phishing SMO 0.218 0.031 0.759 0.218 0.339 0.593
Weighted SMO 0.735 0.548 0.741 0.735 0.68 0.593
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Chapter 9
Related Work
Since it is a much-employed security threat, automatic detection of phishing emails
has attracted significant attention of researchers over the last decade or so. We
highlight and compare our work with respect to best previous related research.
9.1 Phish-IDetector
One attempt to phishing emails classification was made by PILFER [16]. This paper
lists 10 features, both binary as well as continuous numeric ones designed to highlight
user-targeted deception in electronic communication. These features were mainly
based on URL information like: IP based URLs, Age of linked to domain names,
Nonmatching URLs, Number of dots (in the URLs) etc. There were also some other
feature that considered if the emails were in HTML format, the site of redirection,
output from spam filter, etc. Applying machine learning on these extracted features
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via random forest classifier with 10-fold cross validation they could correctly classify
over 96% of the emails. Their false-positive rate was of the order of 0.001%. The
datasets they used were the same as ours but being an older version, the number of
emails were significantly less in their experiments. They had a total of 6950 non-
phishing emails from SpamAssassin [3] dataset and only 860 phishing emails from
the Nazario [30] dataset.
The structural features of the emails such as ‘spoofing of online banks and retail-
ers’, ‘link in the text is different from the destination’, ‘using IP addresses instead of
URLs’, etc. were studied by [10] and these features were selected using the simulated
annealing algorithm. They found that these structural features when combined with
one class support vector machine (SVM), could be used to efficiently classify the
phishing emails before it reaches the users inbox, essentially reducing human expo-
sure. They claimed a 100% precision and recall. However their data set was small
consisting of only 400 emails in total. Half of them were phishing and the other
half were legitimate emails. The phishing emails were collected over a period of 6
months. And the legitimate ones were gathered from (i) postings on newsgroups,
bulletin boards, and from other users inbox and (ii) from 8 different volunteers who
provided emails sent to them from legitimate business organizations such as credit
card statements, online purchase receipts from Amazon, etc.
Some methods utilize the confidence weighted linear classifiers like [5] but it is
only applied to the email body or text unlike our approach. They use the contents
of the emails (word stems) as features without applying any heuristic based phishing
specific features and the best accuracy obtained was 99.77% which is 99.99% in our
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case. They obtained a false positive rate of less than 1%. In simple terms, word stem
refers to the simple form or the root of a word. For example, run is the stem for
running. They represented each email document as a vector of stemmed words which
is commonly known as ‘bag of words’ representation. For the phishing dataset they
used the Nazario corpus and for the legitimate emails they used the SpamAssassin
ham corpus.
A hybrid feature selection approach based on combination of content-based and
behavior-based features was put forward by [20]. It could mine the attacker behavior
based on email header and utilized the Message-ID tags of emails to do so. The
authors analyzed the Message-ID tag and sender email to form a feature called
Domain sender. It is a binary feature that represents the similarity of domain name
extracted from email sender with domain Message-ID. If it is similar, the email is
considered legitimate and the value is set to 0 otherwise 1. This method of hybrid
features selections were able to achieve 96% accuracy rate and 4% false positives
rate. For the phishing emails, they used the same data set as ours but for the
legitimate ones, they only used the easy ham directory of the SpamAssassin corpus
which contained only 2364 ham emails.
Another paper that goes deep into email header analysis is [32]. It studies the
Message-ID field minutely and explains each part that constitute it. Message-ID
generation is discussed in details and the uniqueness of this field is established. The
author shows that spoofing of this field is tough and may not be possible for every
phisher unless he has sound technical knowledge in this field. Hence, the author
suggests that Message-ID could be used to find out about the source of the email
156
which could be useful in forensic analysis.
It is also worth mentioning the work done in the field of phishing emails detection
using the information in the email header, links and body by [41]. They included
natural language processing tools and techniques along with contextual informa-
tion from a user’s mailbox in their email header and body analysis. For the body
of the email they calculate Textscore using lexical analysis, part-of-speech (POS)
tagging,etc. along with verb analysis of action words. They also calculate the Con-
textscore considering the email as a vector of TFIDF. For header analysis they look
at the From, Delivered-to and Received-From fields. And in case of link analysis,
they consider the length of the domains in the url and employ google search to ensure
authenticity of the domain. Their method was able to correctly classify 98% of the
2000 phishing emails and 99.3% of the 1000 legitimate emails.
9.2 Header-Domain Analysis
Please refer to Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1: Related Work for Header Domain Analysis
Classifier Summary Features Results Datasets
Weka:
C4.5 Decision
Tree,Support
Vector
Machine,
Multilayer
Perception,
Nave Bayes,
Bayesian
Network
and Random
Forest (RF).[2]
Identify
potential
header
features
for spam
filtering
using machine
learning
classifiers.
1. Received field
(Hops, Span time,
Domain add, Date,
time, IP Add
legality)
2. Sender add
3. No. of receivers
4. Reception Date
5. X-Mailer
6. Missing/
malformed Msg-ID
7. Subject
Best:
RF classifier
Avg. acc:
98.5%
Precision:
98.4%
Recall:
98.5%
F-Measure:
98.5%
ROC area:
99%.
CEAS2008
live spam
challenge
lab corpus
(26180
spam and
6523 ham)
CSDMC
2010
(1378 spam,
2949 ham)
No
classification
performed.[43]
Analyzed
sender and
receiver field
information to
identify spam.
1. Sender add
validity
2. Receiver add
(To, CC, BCC)
No
classification
performed.
3,417 mails
from
Taiwan’s
ISP.
Random Forest
(RF)
classifier.[21]
Presents an
Intelligent
Hybrid Spam
Filtering
Framework
(IHSFF). Can
identify spam
based on
email header.
1. Originator field
(From)
2. Destination
field (To, CC,
BCC)
3. X-Mailer
4. Sender server
IP add
5. Subject
Best: RF
Accuracy:
96.74%
Precision:
93.53%
Recall:
92.99%
F-Measure:
93.26%.
From a
Chinese
website.
Dataset 1:
33,209
samples
Dataset 2:
21,725
email
headers.
RF, C4.5 DT
(J48), Voting
Feature
Intervals,
Random Tree,
REPTree,
Bayesian
Network
and Naive
Bayes.[35]
Studies
information
in the email
header and
evaluate those
features with
several
machine-
learning
classifiers.
1. From field
2. To and CC
3. Received
4. Message-ID
5. Return-Path
6. Reply-To
7. In Reply-To
8. Error-To
9. Sender
10. Reference
Best: RF
Accuracy:
99.27%,
Precision:
99.40%
Recall:
99.50%
F-Measure:
99.50%.
CEAS2008
(28590
spam,
11410
ham)
CSDMC
2010
(1378
spam,
2949 ham)
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
This thesis presented a multi-dimensional novel approach that is simple yet effective
in detection and classification of phishing emails. It has shown how the unique
characteristics of email headers can be exploited with n-gram analysis to produce
features that can distinguish between phishing and legitimate emails. The approach
in this thesis studies the performance of different classifiers on different order of n-
gram features, some binary and some continuous features from several datasets. The
results obtained are promising. The different systems created prove that the email
is an enormous source of information that could be used for phishing detection. The
header itself can provide enough data for successful classification.
Using information gain, error analysis and security analysis the results are stud-
ied in depth. Most useful features are recognized, causes of misclassification are
investigated and weaknesses of each method are discussed. This thesis thus provides
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a consolidated account of various email header based techniques for phishing detec-
tion. Further collaboration with Text analysis and Link analysis could result in a
very powerful and useful system.
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